U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
16 SEP 1974

THE CRISIS THAT IS BRINGING BASIC CHANGES TO CIA

Outside pressure is forcing CIA to shed some of its old ways—including supersecrecy of the past. No one is yet sure that it's all for the best.

It's a time of sweeping change inside America's top-secret "cloak and dagger" organization—the Central Intelligence Agency.

In broad terms, the CIA is putting less reliance on its "dagger" while at the same time it is revealing more of what's hidden behind its "cloak." In specific terms:

- Covert operations aimed at influencing or overthrowing foreign governments are losing emphasis. Those still authorized are coming under closer scrutiny and supervision.
- Activities by the CIA inside the U. S. are being subjected to tighter control than ever before. The aim is to prevent the agency from becoming involved in illegal operations against Americans at home, such as happened during the Watergate affair.
- A policy of greater openness on the part of Director William E. Colby marks a bid for wider popular understanding and acceptance of CIA. He hopes to overcome widespread distrust of Government intelligence secrecy and to demonstrate that his agency performs a constructive and indispensable service to the nation.
- A far-reaching reorganization has been carried out to meet official criticism of the way the CIA operates. The critics—led by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—complained that much of the agency's work was too academic and unrelated to the needs of Government policy makers. Now the emphasis is shifting from projects that intrigue the CIA to others with practical value for officials such as Mr. Kissinger.

WIDE WORLD

Director William E. Colby has taken over the job of reshaping trouble-ridden CIA.

Survival of CIA. All these changes result from the most serious challenge to the CIA's existence since its establishment in 1947. In fact, the pressure of the challenge has been so heavy that some high-ranking officials in the agency are wondering if a secret intelligence organization can continue to function effectively in the political climate prevailing in the U. S. today.

Outside the agency, critics ask this question: Is a secret intelligence organization really necessary—especially one that has concentrated so much of its resources on operations against foreign governments?

Over all, the Central Intelligence Agency employs more than 16,000 people. Its budget totals roughly 750 million dollars a year—with more than half that amount reportedly spent on covert activities of one kind or another.

Besides a small army of officials and experts at its headquarters outside Washington, the agency has teams assigned to most U. S. embassies around the world.

The crisis that now is raising questions about the CIA's future was fueled by three developments:

1. *CIA involvement in Watergate.* The agency was strongly criticized for allowing itself to be drawn illegally into the Watergate affair on two occasions. One involved the delivery of spy paraphernalia to a former CIA agent, E. Howard Hunt, who was a member of the White House "plumbers." He used the equipment for the break-in at the office of the psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg, accused at that time of giving the secret Pentagon Papers to the press.

The second involved the preparation of a psychological profile of Mr. Ellsberg by CIA experts at the request of the White House. Both actions were denounced by a congressional subcommittee as illegal. The CIA is explicitly prohibited from engaging in domestic security activities of any kind. Legislation now before Congress would tighten the law to reduce the danger of abuse in the future.



YOES IN "SAN DIEGO TRIBUNE"

"I'M BEING SHADOWED"

2. *Breakdown of CIA security.* The agency's ability to protect its secrets is endangered by two publishing ventures involving former agents. One book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," reveals much about the inner workings of the U. S. intelligence establishment. The CIA went to court to contest publication on the grounds that the authors, Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks, were violating contracts signed when they joined the intelligence services.

The court allowed publication with 168 deletions for security reasons. Now another former agent, Philip B. F. Agee, is preparing to publish a 220,000-word book in Britain describing the CIA's clandestine operations in Latin America.

CIA officials warn that its effectiveness could be gravely damaged if this trend continues. As one put it: "We're not worried so much about Marchetti as we are about the 999 others who might follow him with other books."

One point made by intelligence officials: Under existing laws, a Department of Agriculture employe can be jailed for divulging secret crop figures but a CIA employe—present or past—can escape prosecution even if he reveals the identity of secret agents.

3. *Reaction to Vietnam.* The CIA's clandestine role in the Indo-China conflict is blamed by many critics for draw-

00790 continued

Symbol of the new CIA openness is road sign showing the way to headquarters of America's top-secret intelligence organization.



Massive complex in northern Virginia countryside is the command center for CIA's staff of 16,000 that operates around the globe.

CIA's CRISIS

[continued from preceding page]

ing the United States into a war that became highly unpopular and nationally divisive.

Critics contend that such interference in the internal affairs of other countries in peacetime is morally wrong and unnecessary. The charge also is made that these overseas operations are not effectively controlled.

The Bay of Pigs fiasco is cited as a prime example of a covert CIA action that ended in serious international embarrassment for the U. S.

Other examples of "counterproductive" operations listed by critics:

An Indonesian Army rebellion in 1958 aimed at overthrowing the Communist-leaning regime was backed by the CIA. Failure had damaging repercussions for the U. S. among nationalistic Asians.

A Chinese Nationalist Army that took refuge in Northern Burma was helped by the CIA in the 1950s. The American Ambassador in Rangoon, kept in ignorance of the agency's role, repeatedly denied to Burmese leaders U. S. involvement with this 12,000-man force that was engaging in banditry and opium-running while ostensibly preparing for action against Communist China. When the CIA's role came to light, the Ambassador was humiliated and U. S. relations with Burma were damaged for years.

Its achievements. Defenders of the CIA, on the other hand, point to successes achieved by covert operations, including the overthrow of the Mossadegh Government in Iran in 1953 and the establishment of an anti-Communist government in the Congo in the early 1960s.

The CIA has been charged with sabotaging U. S. policy by engaging in "free lance" operations. The defense:

No clandestine operation can be initiated without the explicit authorization of the "40 Committee"—a group headed by Secretary Kissinger, acting in his dual role of director of the National Security Council. Other members of that committee include high-ranking representatives of the Departments of State and Defense as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Furthermore, "watchdog committees" in Congress have unlimited access to information concerning CIA activities. Informed observers say the intelligence agency even is willing to provide the committees with names of its secret agents if requested to do so.

Critics, however, question the effectiveness of these outside controls on the covert operations of the CIA.

Even while the controversy heightens, intelligence officials are the first to admit that covert operations considered acceptable 10 years ago are no longer feasible.

To quote an exceptionally well-informed source on this point:

"In 1963, President Kennedy instructed the CIA to organize a secret army in Laos after the North Vietnamese Communists failed to comply with terms of a political settlement. During the recent Cyprus crisis, the U. S. President likewise had the option to order the CIA to influence events on the island. But he did not—and probably could not—exercise that option."

The most valuable work done by the CIA has nothing to do with secret enterprises. It involves overt intelligence activities of two kinds.

First, the analysis of political, economic and military information by a small army of scholars. Their job is to provide the President and his policy-making aides with assessments of the capabilities and intentions of foreign states and to alert them to any potential crisis situations taking shape.

Espionage agents operating around the world supply some of the information that goes into these assessments. But most of it comes from open sources —such as government reports, technical and academic journals, and broadcasts.

The second form of overt intelligence carried on by the CIA is in the field of technological espionage. Another article on these pages describes the organization's scope.

Spying: a new era? The agency's Director, Mr. Colby, says "technology has revolutionized the intelligence business." In his view, it paved the way for the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by making it possible for the U. S. to monitor compliance with such arms-control treaties.

Under Mr. Colby's leadership during the past year, the "intelligence business" as practiced by the CIA is being revolutionized in another way.

The extreme secrecy that surrounded every aspect of the agency's operations in the past is being relaxed. A symbol of the change: the appearance of road signs indicating the location of the agency's massive headquarters at Langley in the Virginia countryside.

More important, many reports which the CIA Director in the past presented to congressional committees in secrecy now are being made available to the public. These include the agency's assessment of Russian and Chinese economic and military potential as well as a recent controversial analysis of the Soviet Union's naval activities in the Indian Ocean.

What these changes add up to is recognition by top intelligence officials that the domestic and international political scenes have been transformed in the past few years.

During the cold-war years, the CIA had no need to justify its existence—or

continued

its methods. The "James Bond" image of secret armies and airtight security was acceptable during that period.

Then came Soviet-American *détente*, a new cynicism concerning official secrecy as a result of Watergate, and disillusionment over the Vietnam War.

A critical attitude surfaced, putting America's secret intelligence agency on the defensive. Now it is striving to create a new and more open public image while, at the same time, preserving the degree of secrecy that is necessary for the survival of its worldwide espionage network.

C0792